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Introduction
The concept of globalization has been central to many of the political and intellectual
discourses of the 1990s. Used in very different ways by neoliberals, postmodernists and
radical environmentalists among others, globalization has been interpreted in cultural,
technological and geopolitical terms.
In this paper, attention will focus primarily on economic and financial aspects of
the globalization debate, and on their implications for public policy. Globalization will
therefore be defined as an increase in the international integration of markets for goods,
services, capital and l bour. However, these economic developments cannot be separated
from their historical and political context. The current discussion of globalizati n can
only be understood in relation to the development of economic and political institutions
over the past century.
Globalization is frequently discussed as a counterpoint to national sovereignty. It is
commonly asserted that globalization has eroded national sovereignty or that it has rendered
borders obsolete. In particular, it is asserted that, in a glob lized world economy, govern-
ments have no alternative but to adopt neoliberal economic policies of privatization,
deregulation and reductions in public expenditure.
 In assessing claims about gl balization and sovereignty, it is useful to begin by
observing that sovereignty is itself a complex term. Krasner (1999) usefully distinguishes
four different concepts of sovereignty. International legal sovereignty is the acceptance
of a given state as a member of the international community, and is, in most cases,
relatively uncontroversial. Westphalian sovereignty is based on the principle that one
sovereign state should not interfere in the domestic arrangements of another.
Interdependence sovereignty is the capacity and willingness to control flows of people,
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goods and capital into and out of a country. Domestic sovereignty is the capacity of a
state to choose and implement policies within its territory.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the emerging literature on glob lizati focused
primarily on the apparent erosion of interdependence sovereignty and Westphalian
sovereignty. Much of this literature was primarily concerned to criticiz ‘realist’ models
of international politics in which the Westphalian notion of the state as a unitary actor are
taken as axiomatic (Camilleri and Falk 1992).
During the 1990s, a neoliberal account of globalization came to the fore. The
starting point of the neoliberal account of globalization is the observation that states have
abandoned or lost much of the interdependence sovereignty they possessed for most of
the 20th century. It is then argued that this loss of interdependence sovereignty entails a
loss of domestic economic sovereignty, so that states are constrained by the pressures of
international capital markets to follow the neoliberal policy agenda of deregulation,
privatization and small government, regardless of the wishes of their domestic electorates
(Ohmae 1990, Friedman 1999). A similar view is implicit, though not always clearly
argued, in postmodernist and ‘Third Way’ accounts of gl balization (Giddens 1999). In
addition, left-wing writers such as Panitch (1994) and Strange (1996), while deploring
convergence on a neoliberal policy agenda, broadly accept the claim that such convergence
is the result of technologically-driven developments in the world economy.
This paper is a critical analysis of the neoliberal account of globalization, written
from a social-democratic viewpoint. Its main object is to present the globaliza ion d bate
in its historical context and to consider the analytical implications of the observation that
globalization is not fundamentally new, but is, in large measure, a reversion to the
economic institutions of the 19th century. The experience of the late 19th century casts
doubt on claims that the loss of interdependence sovereignty implies the erosion of
Westphalian sovereignty. The claim that the loss of interdependence sovereignty entails
the adoption of neoliberal domestic policies is similarly problematic. The paper concludes
3
with a consideration of options for social-democratic responses to neoliberal globalization.
The fall and rise of the global economy
Much of the popular discussion of globalization is based on the assumption that we
are dealing with a wholly new phenomenon, driven by technological change. This assumption
also dominated the early literature on globalization, which focussed on the steady increase
in economic integration since 1945 (for example, Camilleri and Falk 1992).
More recent writers have pointed out that this assumption is incorrect and that, in
important respects, the world economy was just as globalized in the late 19th century as
it is today (Baker, Epstein and Pollitt 1998, Williamson 1998). This does not mean,
however, that the processes described as globalization are unimportant. The fact that the
world economy is now returning to an institutional framework very similar to that of last
century is highly significant, as is the fact that, until a few decades ago, this institutional
framework was almost universally regarded as an outmoded failure.
The global economy before 1914
The world economy in the period before 1914 was one of untrammeled global
capitalism. As early as the mid-19th century, Marx and Engels (1976, first published
1848) observed the rise of a global economy dominated by the European bourgeoisie.
By 1900, the main rail networks in use today had been put in place, and the
combination of steel hulls and steam had produced cargo ships capable of equalling or
exceeding the speeds at which sea freight usually travels today. As far as the transport of
goods is concerned, subsequent advances have been incremental. Moreover, with the
laying of the trans-Atlantic telegraph line in 1866, communications between the major
international financial entres became instantaneous. As a result of these linkages, the
reliance on overseas investment of European colonies countries and of the newly
independent nations of Latin America was greater in 1914 than that of developing countries
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today (Waltz 2000). Moreover, because of restrictions on migration, labour mobility is
much lower today than in the 19th century (Baker, Epstein and Pollitt 1988).
The ratio of merchandise exports to world GDP has risen modestly, from 8.7 per
cent in 1913 to 13.5 per cent in 1990. However, it is important to note that intra-European
trade has made a large contribution to the growth in the ratio of trade to world GDP. As
will be discussed below, the implications of intra-European trade for globalizati n are
ambiguous. On the other hand, it has been argued that growth in intra-industry trade and
trade within global corporations is indicative of a deeper level of integration than the
19th century model in which raw materials from the colonial and developing world were
traded for manufactured goods from the developed world (Reich 1991, Feenstra 1998,
Held et al. 1999).
The central institution of the global financial system in the 19th century was the
gold standard. Under the gold standard, the exchange rate between any two currencies
was the ratio of their values in gold. Currencies were freely convertible into gold at fixed
rates.  The combination of the fixed exchange rates implied by adherence to the gold
standard and free movement of capital left individual countries with little or no freedom
of movement in monetary policy.
The operation of the gold standard is an example of the ‘impossible trinity’. It is
possible to maintain any two of fixed exchange rates, free movement of capital and
independent domestic monetary policy, but not all three (Mundell 1963). In this sense,
then, the loss or abandonment of interdependence sovereignty entails a corresponding
loss of domestic sovereignty. As Mundell (1963) observes, however, the implication is
not that governments are powerless but that, under fixed exchange rates, they must rely
more on fiscal policy, while, under floating exchange rates an independent monetary
policy is possible.
The economic integration of the 19th century global economy contrasted sharply
with the absence of political integration. In political terms, the second half of the 19th
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century was the high point of the nation-state. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 had
ended attempts at the imposition of any supranational authority on European states.1 The
‘Westphalian’ doctrine of states as independent actors was powerfully bolstered by the
19th century theory of nationalism, under which legitimate states were assumed to
correspond to nations, that is, groups of people united by language and culture. Giddens
(1985) aptly refers to these putative nations as ‘imagined communities’.
In the Westphalian system, the interests and goals of nation-states were widely
assumed to transcend those of any individual citizen or even any ruler. Although practical
considerations still led powerful states to seek to influence the affairs of others, forcible
intervention by one country in the domestic affairs of another was less frequent in the
period between 1850 and 1900 than in most previous and subsequent periods (Leurdijk
1986).
The starting point of international law in the 19th century was the presumption that
states were legal persons acting in a Hobbesian state of nature. That is, unless they had
bound themselves by treaty, states were free to act as they chose in pursuit of their own
self-interest. Moreover, it was generally assumed that, in the absence of countervailing
force, states could advance their self-interest through the use or threat of military force to
gain territorial and economic benefits.
A few dissenters, most notably Angell (1911), argued that, in a globalizedfree-market
economic system, no economic benefit could be generated even by successful wars of
conquest. Writing for a British audience, Angell’s basic point was that, even if Germany
succeeded in establishing political mastery in Europe, workers in the newly subjected
countries would still have to be paid, goods would have to be purchased at market prices
and so on. Hence, individual Germans would gain nothing from being part of a larger
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1 However, as Kratochwil (1995) points out, the treaties of Osnabruck and Munster required
a number of the signatory states to adopt measures of religious tolerance, contrary to the principle of
non-interference in internal affairs. The ‘Westphalian’ doctrine of ‘cuius regio, eius religio’ (the religion
of the prince determines the religion of the state) had been enunciated in the Peace of Augsburg in 1555,
but proved incapable of maintaining peace.
country.
Angell’s argument anticipated much of the critique of international political realism
put forward in the globalization debate. However, seeking to counteract the rising pressure
for war, he argued that Germans would correctly perceive their own self-interest and
would therefore not support an aggressive war. He was rapidly proved false on this point
by the outbreak of the Great War in 1914.2 Nevertheless, the War confirmed Angell’s
view that attempts to gain economic advantage through military power had become
obsolete. Both sides suffered catastrophic losses. The attempt by the victors to recoup
some of their losses through the reparations imposed in the Treaty of Versailles proved
both fruitless and economically disastrous (Keynes 1920).
In addition to the conflict between the global economy and the Westphalian system
of nation-states, the capitalist system was facing increasing pressure from socialist and
social-democratic critics, who condemned both the poverty and inequality generated by
the system and the cycle of boom and bust, which was seen by many (particularly
Marxists) as certain to intensify over time. The first steps towards the creation of social
welfare systems were a response to these pressures, but necessitated greater government
intervention and higher taxes (though taxes were still very low by the standards of the
second half of the century).
In summary, the global system of the late 19th century was one of almost complete
Westphalian sovereignty, combined with very limited interdependence sovereignty. The
fact that this system remained stable for more than fifty years casts doubt on the view
that erosion of interdependence sovereignty necessarily entails a loss of Westphalian
sovereignty. On the other hand, the catastrophic collapse of the system in 1914 may be
seen as an inevitable, or at least probable, outcome of the contradictions inherent in the
system. In the vast literature on the origins of the Great War, many other views have
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2 I use the term by which the War was known at the time, rather than the more common
‘World War I’, in part to stress the continuity between the 1914–18 and 1939–45 wars.
been put forward, of which the most important are that the War was an unlucky accident
and that the War was the result of German militarism. Some combination of these views
is naturally attractive to Westphalian realists such as Taylor (1969).
Domestically, the system involved an apparently unstable balance between newly
enfranchized democratic electorates, which expected government action to redress the
inequities of capitalism, and highly mobile international capital, which demanded adherence
to the doctrines of sound finance. Williamson (1998) argues that the contradiction between
open borders and domestic sovereignty had already generated significant movement towards
tariff protection and restrictions on immigration by the early 20th century. The collapse
of the system in 1914 left unresolved the conflict between glo alization and domestic
sovereignty, which re-emerged as a vital issue in the 1990s.
The failure of the global economy 1914–39
The process of globalization went into reverse for most of the 20th century. To
understand this process, it is necessary to examine the way in which the global economic
institutions of the 19th century broke down. As was noted above, by 1914, the global
economy of liberal capitalism faced external and internal stresses which seemed likely to
result in major structural changes.
The question of whether the global economic system could have survived these
stresses was rendered academic by the failure of the political system to prevent the
outbreak of the Great War in Europe. By the time Germany and its allies surrendered in
1918, Britain's position as the leading world economy had been lost forever, and trade
among the European economies had fallen almost to zero. Wartime inflation had forced
the major powers to abandon gold convertibility.
Nevertheless, the prime objective of policy after 1918 was to return to prewar
normality as rapidly as possible. In political terms, the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian
and Russian empires allowed the completion of the 19th century movement to redraw
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European boundaries on the lines of nationalist theory, inevitably creating a new set of
national grievances and drawing the battle lines for future wars. Apart from the attempt
to demilitarize Germany, the only move away from the Hobbesian theory of international
politics was the creation of the ineffectual League of Nations.
 In economic terms, this meant not merely a return to the gold standard, but a return
to prewar price levels. The need to force price levels down required a long deflationary
slump and high unemployment throughout the 1920s (Keynes 1925). By the late 1920s,
however, it appeared to most observers that prewar normality had returned. Although the
return to the gold standard had been made unduly difficult by insistence on a return to
prewar parities, it had been achieved. Trade was expanding rapidly. Most importantly,
the United States, now unquestionably the world's leading economy, was booming.
Moreover, it was widely believed that the newly developed tools of monetary policy
allowed central banks to stabilize the economy, eliminating the century-old cycle of
boom and slump.
The Great Depression, which followed the stockmarket crash of 1929, ended hopes
of a return to the 19th century economic system. The gold standard was finally abandoned
and tariff barriers were greatly increased. Trade was increasingly confined to blocs by
devices such as Imperial preferences. More than this, the Depression discredited liberal
capitalism, seemingly forever. Even the supporters of capitalism were disillusioned, or at
least recognized the inevitability of some move away from l issez-faire. The ‘economic
policy for a free society’ put forward by leading Chicago economist Henry Simons
(1948), allowed for far more g v rnment intervention than the free-market orthodoxy of
the 19th century.
The most effective theoretical challenge to the free-market system was Keynes’
(1936) analysis showing how unemployment could remain high indefinitely because of
inadequate demand. The most effective practical challenge was Roosevelt’s New Deal,
which showed that government intervention could yield substantial benefits. Support for
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Keynesianism and for more extensive systems of economic planning was greatly enhanced
by the experience of the wartime planning between 1939 and 1945. The contrast between
the chaos of the Depression and the success of wartime planning convinced most observers
that laissez-faire capitalism was fundamentally flawed. The point was made very effectively
by the White Paper on Full Employment in Australia (Commonwealth of Australia 1945)
Despite the need for more houses, food, equipment and every other type
of product, before the war not all those available for work were able to
find employment or to feel a sense of security in their future. On the
average during the twenty years between 1919 and 1939 more than
one-tenth of the men and women desiring work were unemployed. In
the worst period of the depression well over 25 per cent were left in
unproductive idleness. By contrast, during the war no financial or other
obstacles have been allowed to prevent the need for extra production
being satisfied to the limit of our resources.
The failure of free-market economic policies after 1914 guaranteed the failure of the
Versailles political settlement. The Great Depression led to the rise of Hitler and then to
the renewal of world war in 1939. The global economy of the 19th century and the
associated political system were gone, seemingly forever.
The Bretton Woods system
After 1945, the victorious allies sought to establish a set of national and international
institutions that would secure peace, ensure that the Depression did not return, and protect
people from the chaos and insecurity associated with unregulated free markets. Whereas
in 1919, the aim of postwar reconstruction had been to return to prewar ‘normality’, the
economic and political institutions of the 1945 settlement were based on the view that the
institutions of the past had failed.
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At a political level, the theory underlying the postwar settlement was one of co-
operative internationalism. The assumption that nation-states were free to pursue their
own interests was replaced by a belief in a system of international law which bound all
states, whether or not they accepted it. This assumption was reflected in the replacement
of the failed League of Nations by the United Nations, which had the power to intervene
militarily  in cases of war and civil conflict, and by the creation of international crimes
including ‘waging aggressive war’ and ‘genocide’ under which the Nazi leaders and
lesser war criminals were tried.
In practice, the international political structure was rendered ineffectual by the Cold
War. Except for the anomaly of the Korean War, when a boycott by Russia and China
permitted the United States and its allies to claim the authority of the United Nations, the
superpowers used their veto rights to block any intervention by the United Nations in
their affairs and those of subject and allied nations. Hence, the United Nations was
confined to peacekeeping operations in peripheral conflicts where neither of the competing
blocs was directly involved.
The economic component of the postwar settlement was more effective, though its
operation was confined to the non-Communist countries. The object of the system of
international economic co-operation was to control capital flows in a way which allowed
for both fixed exchange rates and sufficient domestic freedom in economic policy to
permit the maintenance of full employment.
The crucial institutional decisions were made at Bretton Woods (New Hampshire,
United States) in 1944, and led to the establishment of two international institutions, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (the World Bank). The IMF was to provide short-term assistance to countries
experiencing balance-of-payments problems. The World Bank was to provide long-term
finance for development projects. These institutions, it was hoped, would provide a
framework for international capital flows which captured the benefits available from
11
international borrowing and lending without the instability associated with uncontrolled
international markets.
In the Bretton Woods system, the United States took over the role played by Britain
in the gold standard system. The US dollar was convertible into gold at a fixed rate of
$35 per ounce. Hence, as long as other countries maintained fixed exchange rates with
the US dollar, their currencies were effectively pegged to gold. As a result, the stability
of the system depended, in the long term, on the maintenance of price stability. However,
the restrictions on capital flows, the availability of short-term assistance from the IMF
and the fact that occasional devaluations and revaluations were considered acceptable
meant that, over fairly long periods, moderate inflation was consistent with the maintenance
of the system.
The achievement of full employment was the basis of a much broader consensus.
All parties agreed on the need for extensive systems of social welfare, and on the need
for extensive government intervention, including, in most countries, public ownership of
basic infrastructure  (roads, electricity, telecommunications and so on) and public provision
of human services (health, education and other community services). Although socialist
parties formally advocated complete nationalization of industry, in practice they accepted
private ownership of primary industry, manufacturing and wholesale and retail trade.
The result was referred to as the ‘mixed economy’, and was put forward as a ‘third
way ’ transcending the opposition between the polar alternatives of laissez-faire capitalism
and a Soviet-style command economy (Shonfield 1984). The combination of Keynesian
stabilization policies, the welfare state and a strong public role in infrastructure produced
a distinctively new economic system rather than a mere compromise between the command
economy and the free market.3
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3  In the 1990s, advocates of a ‘Third Way’ such as Giddens (1999) similarly aspired to
transcend the opposition between the mixed economy (the Third Way of the post war boom) and
neoliberal globalism (a revival of the orthodoxy of the 19th century). So far, however, little more than a
messy compromise has been achieved.
The reconstruction of the international financial system was intended to complement
the domestic mixed economy by preventing or ameliorating international financial crises.
Trade played a subsidiary role in the mixed economy. The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) was an attempt to reduce barriers to trade, which had proliferated
during the Great Depression. However, the maintenance of full employment retained
priority. Many countries used import quotas and dual exchange rates to maintain external
balance when domestic demand was strong.
Decline of the Bretton Woods system and fiscal crisis of the state
From 1945 to the late 1960s, the Bretton Woods system, in association with the use
of Keynesian macroeconomic policies, functioned effectively in most developed countries.
The period from 1945 to 1970 was unparalleled in the history of capitalism as one of full
employment and rapid economic growth in the developed countries.
Despite the exceptional nature of this 'golden age', only limited research has been
undertaken into the factors that made the 'golden age' possible and the reasons for its
breakdown. Still less is there any consensus on either of these issues. The assumption
that prevailed at the time, that prosperity was a direct result of the adoption of Keynesian
macroeconomic policies, is untenable in the light of subsequent experience of the limitations
of those policies. The suggestion that the boom was simply the result of postwar
reconstruction does not stand up to scrutiny (Marglin and Schor 1990), but there is no
simple alternative.
Some consequences of the success of the mixed economy are evident however. In
particular, the perceived ability of governments to manage the economy strengthened
support for government i tervention more generally, and weakened the capacity of business
to oppose such intervention.
The role of government expanded rapidly in the immediate postwar period as
industries were nationalized, social security systems were put in place or expanded and
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public responsibility for education and health care was generally accepted. In most countries,
the boundaries between the public and private sectors that characterized the mixed economy
were in place by the early 1950s.
Although the role of g vernment did not change much in qualitative terms between
the 1950s and the 1970s, quantitative measures of the size of the public sector, such as
the ratio of public expenditure to GDP increased steadily. A number of factors contributed
to the growth of the public sector.
The most important was the growth in the human services sector, encompassing
such ‘social infrastructure’ services such as health, education, police and welfare services.
The demand for human services tends to rise with income, and to increase as a proportion
of total demand as income rises. At low levels of income a large share of expenditure
must be devoted to necessary goods such as food, shelter and basic clothing, and services
may be regarded as luxuries. In communities with the income levels of developed countries,
the satisfaction of these basic needs requires only a small proportion of total income.
On the other hand, productivity growth in the services sector has been limited. The
growth of the services sector was first analyzed in these terms by Baumol (1967), who
argued that if labour productivity grew more slowly in the services sector than in other
sectors such as manufacturing, and it was desired to maintain output in the services sector
at least as a constant proportion of total output, it was necessary that resources should be
progressively transferred towards the services sector.
The growth in demand for human services generated what O'Connor (1973) described
as ‘the fiscal crisis of the state’. From the late 1960s onward, governments faced intractable
problems in reconciling growing demands for services with increasing resistance to higher
rates of taxation. In the United States, the growth in domestic expenditure was accompanied
by a large increase in military expenditure associated with the Vietnam war. This expenditure
was largely financed through budget deficits. The expansionary effects of these deficits
reinforced the inflationary pressure for increases in wages and other incomes associated
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with a prolonged period of full employment.
The use of budget deficits to finance the Vietnam war and the Great Society social
programs was justified in part by an over-optimistic view of the capacity of Keynesian
macroeconomic policies to combine very low levels of unemployment with acceptable,
and stable, inflation rates. However, the growth of budget deficits also reflected the onset
of the fiscal crisis of the state, as governments found increasing difficulty in raising
sufficient revenue to fund their expenditure programs.
Rising rates of inflation put the Bretton Woods system under increasing strain.
Sustained inflation undermined both the international role of the US dollar as a reserve
currency pegged to gold and the Keynesian system of domestic economic management.
The pressures arising from inflation were exacerbated by the relaxation of the tight
restrictions on international capital movements that prevailed at the end of World War II.
Exchange controls were relaxed in many countries. The inflationary surge associated
with the financing of the Vietnam war would eventually have forced the abandonment of
$US convertibility into gold. However, the process was accelerated by the increased
capacity of participants in international financial markets to speculate against currencies
seen as overvalued. In the early 1970s, convertibility was abandoned and the Bretton
Woods system collapsed.
Globalization since 1970
Financial liberalization and macroeconomic policy
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the upsurge of inflation rendered a
system of fixed exchange rates untenable. Most countries moved to some form of floating
or adjustable rate and simultaneously relaxed restrictions on international capital flows.
The process of international financial deregulation, which took place over the 1970s in
most countries, enhanced pressure for deregulation of domestic capital markets. Domestic
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deregulation took place gradually during the 1970s and more rapidly during the 1980s. It
was this process of policy change, rather than technical developments in telecommunications
and computing, that was responsible for the growth of international financial markets. The
primary contribution of technical change was to facilitate growth in very short-term
transactions, both domestic and international.
The collapse of the system of fixed exchange rates was accompanied by the
abandonment of Keynesian macroeconomic policies, which had proved largely ineffectual
in the context of ‘stagflation’ (simultaneous inflation and unemployment) and the associated
‘supply-side’ shocks to international commodity prices, most notably the OPEC oil price
shock of October 1973. Because monetarist critics such as Friedman (1968) had accurately
observed the vulnerability of the Keynesian policies of the 1960s to accelerating inflation,
it was widely assumed that their main policy proposal, namely that central banks should
target the rate of growth of the money supply, would provide a relatively painless method
of restoring price stability.
In reality, monetarism proved no more successful than Keynesianism as a response
to stagflation, and policies of monetary targeting were abandoned by the early 1980s.
Although emphasis remained on monetary policy rather than fiscal policy, the strict
monetarist approach was replaced by a somewhat eclectic mixture of monetarist and
Keynesian ideas.
Neoliberalism
Just as the successes of Keynesian macroeconomic management increased the
credibility of the case for government intervention in the economy, the decline of
Keynesianism was accompanied by more general disillusionment with the role of govern-
ment. From the viewpoint of neoliberal globalists, the entire 20th century was a long
detour from the natural path of development of the global economy. In most cases,
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neoliberal globalists see the global political and economic system of the 21st century as
being broadly similar to that of the 19th. In the global system advocated by neoliberals,
interdependence sovereignty is largely eliminated, except with respect tomigration.
Domestic economic sovereignty is tightly constrained, with all participants in international
capital markets being forced to adopt a model similar to that of the United States. The key
elements of the neoliberal domestic program include privatization of government business
enterprises and social security schemes, economic deregulation, and private provision of
services such as health and education.
In neoliberal accounts of globalization, the growth in flows of goods, services and
capital frequently presented as an exogenous force necessitating free-market domestic
reforms. It would be more accurate to see the removal of barriers as the international
component of the neoliberal policy program. Admittedly, the removal of restrictions on
trade and capital flows tends to undermine interventionist domestic policies. Equally,
however, the adoption of the domestic component of the neoliberal policy packages
enhances pressure for liberalization of trade and capital flows.
Neoliberals claim that their domestic and international policy package is a proven
success. During the 1980s and early 1990s, they contrasted the supposed success of
radical free-market reforms in English-speaking countries including New Zealand, the
United Kingdom and Australia with the supposedly sclerotic performance of the European
social democracies.
In fact, the example of New Zealand provides no support for the laissez fair
model. Following disappointing economic performance for most of the period since
World War II, successive New Zealand governments imposed radical economic reforms
after 1984. Although the reforms won the admiration of neoliberals around the world,
New Zealand’s economic performance deteriorated. Growth in New Zealand since 1984
has been well below the OECD average, and also slower than in Australia, which faced
broadly similar conditions but which adopted less radical reforms (Quiggin 1998).
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The results of neoliberal reform in the United Kingdom and Australia have been
mixed at best. Both countries experienced promising improvements in the mid-1980s (the
period of the ‘Thatcher miracle’ in the United Kingdom), severe recessions commencing
in the late 1980s, and moderately strong recoveries in the 1990s. For the period since
1980 as a whole, economic performance in Australia and the United Kingdom has been
broadly comparable to the OECD average. In terms of GDP per capita, the gap between
the two countries and the leading group of European countries has remained almost
unchanged.
The current appeal of the neoliberal story relies largely on a US-centric view of the
world, in which the major political and economic questions are seen through the lens of
the Cold War with the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union is seen as
demonstrating the superiority of American economic and political institutions. On the
political front, American triumphalism after the Cold War was relatively short-lived. The
‘New World Order’ did not live up to expectations, and many Americans are clearly
disillusioned with their political system. But economically, the performance of the United
States since the end of the Cold War has been seen as confirmation of the superiority of
the free market.
This claim depends critically on the assumption that the current US boom will
continue or, at least, that it will be followed by a ‘soft landing’ and steady growth.
However, there are a number of features of the current boom that make it appear
unsustainable. First, the boom is largely driven by a speculative bubble in stock prices.
Almost no-one now claims that the market values being accorded to Internet stocks are
sustainable.
Second, because consumption has been fuelled by capital gains, US household
savings are now negative. The counterpart to disappearing private savings has been the
growth in the current account deficit, now approaching 5 per cent of US GDP. The need
to borrow on this scale makes the US economy very vulnerable to a change in the
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sentiments of capital markets
A third characteristic of an unsustainable boom is a breakdown in financial and
accounting standards. This is clearly evident in the United States, as firms increasingly
use devices such as payment in stock options to boost their reported profits. In this and
other respects, the economy appears to pulling itself up by its own bootstraps: the stock
market can keep rising only if profits keep rising; profits keep rising because of increasing
use of stock options and the like; and stock options are a viable method of payment only
if the stock market keeps rising.
It is impossible to predict the future with any certainty, but we can look at the past
twenty years and observe that, for the period as a whole, the economic performance of
the United States has not been nearly as strong as is often supposed. According to the
International Labour Organization, productivity growth since 1980 in the United States
(measured in output per hour worked) has been weaker than in any of the major Asian or
European economies. Output growth in the United States has been driven largely by a
steady increase in annual hours of work (yet another reversion to the labour market
characteristics of the 19th century).
Is there any alternative ?
Capital markets and neoliberal globalization
Friedman (1999) refers to the neoliberal program outlined above as the ‘Golden
Straightjacket’, implying that nations that accept this program will prosper, at the cost of
sacrificing freedom to respond to the preferences of their electorates for more interventionist
policies. As in other accounts of globalization, Friedman does not make it clear whether
adoption neoliberal policies is necessary for prosperity because these policies are inherently
desirable or because they are demanded by participants in international capital markets.
Friedman’s claim, which Bell (1997) describes as the ‘neoliberal convergence’
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hypothesis has been criticized on a number of empirical grounds. A notable example is
the observation that more open economies, which are presumably more subject to the
pressures of globalization tend to have higher ratios of government expenditure to gross
domestic product (Cameron 1978). There are also significant theoretical problems in the
argument underlying the neoliberal convergence hypothesis.
The claim that capital markets will generally reward sound economic policies is
based on the ‘strong efficient capital markets hypothesis’ which states that the prices of
financial assets reflect the best estimate of future returns based on all available inf rmation.
It follows from the strong efficient capital markets hypothesis that the adoption of desirable
(undesirable) economic policies by the government of a given country will lead to an
increase (decrease) in the price of financial assets. However, there is little evidence to
support the strong efficient capital markets hypothesis, and a good deal to suggest that
markets can produce irrational bubbles, excess volatility and an excessive focus on short-
term outcomes (Shiller 1989, Quiggin 1995).
Moreover, policies which increase the returns to financial assets may not improve
the performance of the economy as a whole. For example, policies that shift the burden
of tax from capital to labour will raise the price of financial assets, whether or not they
are economically beneficial.
More importantly, the majority of internationally traded financial assets are fixed-
interest securities, such as bonds. The returns to fixed-interest securities depend only on
the rate of inflation for the currency in which the security is denominated and on the risk
that the issuer will default. Hence, financial markets naturally favour policies that place a
high weight on price stability. However, as the example of New Zealand shows, policies
that place an excessive weight on price stability tend to increase the severity of fluctuations
in output and employment and to lower the long-term rate of economic growth.
The question of whether the policies favoured by capital markets are socially desirable
is academic if, as is commonly asserted, governments have no choice but to adopt those
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policies. However, assertions of this kind have little basis in reality. To put the power of
international financial markets in perspective, consider the implications of a decision by
the international rating agencies to upgrade or downgrade public debt. A decision to
reject policies of privatization might lead to a single downgrade, say from AAA to AA,
which implies a reduction of about half a percentage point in the interest rate payable on
debt. On a gross public debt equal to 50 per cent of GDP, the resulting increase in annual
interest payments is equal to 0.25 per cent of GDP. Even if such an upgrade were
maintained for 20 years, the aggregate cost would be around 5 per cent of GDP, less than
the cost of a minor recession.
The objective danger posed by international financial markets is not that they can
effectively impose their political preferences on gov rnments. Rather it is the risk of a
panic flight of capital in response to a sudden change of sentiment. Unfortunately, there
is no easy way of preventing such changes in sentiment. While capital flight has sometimes
taken place from countries where governments have tried to fight capital markets (for
example, the expansionist program of the Mitterand government), most recent capital
flights have occurred because financial markets have suddenly turned sour on governments
that had been regarded as paragons of financial reform only a few months previously
(Chile in 1980 and Mexico in 1996).
National sovereignty and international competitiveness
The metaphor of the ‘Golden Straightjacket’ implies that, in a world of freely
mobile capital, governments have very little freedom in their choice of economic policies.
In a globalized economy, it is often argued, overnments are constrained by the need for
international competitiveness.
However, the notion of ‘competitiveness’ used in this argument is based on a false
analogy between a national economy and a private firm (Krugman 1996). If a private
firm is less efficient than its competitors, it will be unable to pay market wages to its
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employees and return a market rate of return to its investors. If the inefficiency is great
enough, the firm will go bankrupt and the resources it employs will either be hired by
other firms or will become unemployed.
If labour is not internationally mobile, no such process of bankruptcy is applicable
to national economies. If a country adopts inefficient economic policies, the result will be
a reduction in labour productivity and therefore, ultimately, in the equilibrium level of
real wages. The process is similar whether the inefficiencies are generated in the traded
or the non-traded goods sectors of the economy. Inefficiencies in the traded goods sector
produce persistent deficits in the balance of trade in goods and services which must be
resolved by a real devaluation, that is one which raises the cost of tradeable goods and
services and is not offset by compensating increases in real wages. The only technically
valid use of the term ‘competitiveness’ is as a shorthand for an index of the real exchange
rate.
The most important implication of this discussion is that, in a world of mobile
capital, government policy can affect only labour income. Hence, attention should be
focussed on policies that affect either the productivity of labour or the distribution of
labour income. The most important examples are education, health, tax and social welfare
systems. Thus a critical issue in the analysis of globalization is whether, as is claimed by
neoliberals such as Friedman (1999), institutional frameworks for the provision of education,
health care and retirement income are converging, or should converge, to some free-market
norm.
The claim that international financial markets will produce optimal policy outcomes
is weak, particularly, in relation to policies that affect the long-term productivity of
labour. Clearly, investment in countries with high labour productivity is attractive. Hence,
rational investors will favour public expenditure that enhances labour productivity. On
the other hand, the short-term focus of financial markets entails an excessive emphasis on
demands for tax reductions. Thus, while financial markets are unlikely to endorse drastic
22
cuts in public expenditure on health and education services, they will tend to encourage
lower levels of provision than are socially optimal.
Empirically, a comparison of the education, health and tax–welfare policies of
different OECD countries shows that there is a wide variation in both the content of
policies and the associated institutional frameworks (Mitchell 1991). Moreover, the main
constraints on governments appear to arise from the difficulty of changing existing
institutional frameworks rather than from the pressures generated by the need for
international competitiveness. For example, the reliance of the United States on employer-
funded health care is deeply entrenched, despite its obvious drawbacks.
In responding to the fiscal crisis of the state, governments have relied at least as
much on increasingly centralized control as on increasing competition. For example,
reform of education policy and local government in the United Kingdom enhanced the
power of the national government a  the expense of local authorities,
Moreover, a number of attempts at increased reliance on market forces for the
provision of human services have failed, or been abandoned in the face of public opposition.
Most notably, the reform of the New Zealand health system, based on systematic application
of the ‘purchaser–provider split’, proved entirely unsuccessful with most of the managers
of the newly created Crown Health Enterprises resigning within a few years (Easton
1997).
The case for the optimality of private-sector, market-driven provision rests on
assumptions of perfect information and costless access to capital markets that are not
satisfied, even approximately. There is not even a single optimal model of intervention,
since the desirable policy outcome will depend on such factors as the homogeneity or
diversity of the population the risk-aversion of individuals and the willingness or
unwillingness of society to accept inequality in opportunities and outcomes. The optimal
policy mixture is likely to be different for different countries.
Even where there is evidence to suggest that one policy approach is superior to
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another, the costs of maintaining a suboptimal policy are usually small relative to national
income, and there is no evidence to suggest that international competition will enforce
the adoption of superior policies. Suboptimal economic policies, whether they apply to
industries engaged in international trade, or to purely domestic activities, will reduce
national income. If money incomes do not decline, the exchange rate must depreciate, but
the idea that a country can ‘lose international competitiveness’ in such a way as to be
driven out of all the export markets in which it operates is nonsensical.
This point is particularly important in assessing developments in labour markets,
where the divergence between the United States and the European social democracies is
marked, particularly in relation to working hours. Annual hours worked per employee in
the United States have risen steadily, from around 1800 hours per year in 1980 to more
than 2000 hours peryear in 1998. The result is like turning the clock back several decades.
Average hours of work for US manufacturing workers were higher in 1998 than in 1950
(Bureau of Labour Statistics 2000). Working hours in the United States are similar to
those in much poorer countries, like Mexico and Hungary. Dutch and Norwegian workers
average around 1400 hours per year, about two-thirds of the US level. Workers in other
European countries average around 1600 hours (International Labour Organization 1999).
The French have led the way in resisting pressure for American-style working
conditions. In 1997, the ‘loi Aubry’ set a maximum working week of 39 hours, applicable
to all workers including managers. The maximum was lowered to 35 hours per week with
effect from February 1 2000. There have been some offsets, such as systems of annualization,
allowing a maximum of 48 hours per week. However, the majority of agreements concluded
so far call for annual hours of less than 1600 hours for full-time workers, equivalent to
about 45 weeks per year at 35 hours per week. Despite Anglo-Saxon predictions of
disaster, the new law has been accompanied by strong economic growth and falling
unemployment.
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State capacity
The idea of ‘state capacity’ (Mann 1988) is useful in understanding the debate about
globalization and neoliberalism. Despite claims to the contrary, the state retains a substantial
capacity to intervene effectively in the economy (Weiss 1998). However, that capacity has
not grown in line with the demands implied by the range of responsibilities taken on by
governments in the postwar period, giving rise to the notion of a ‘capacity gap’ (Evans
1997).
When the inadequate capacity of the state to meet all its obligations becomes
undeniable, a period of crisis occurs, which, in most cases, has been followed by reforms
aimed at increasing the role of the market and winding back that of the state. Because the
growth in public provision of human services represents a response to real social and
economic needs, however, neoliberal attempts to reduce the level of provision and the
role of government have not, in general, been successful. As a result, the fiscal crisis of
the state has been followed, not by fundamental change, but by a prolonged period of
'muddling through'.
The crisis of the 1970s, then, may be seen as a result of states overreaching their
capacity, producing a corresponding overreaction in the 1980s and 1990s. A Ro rik
(1996, p2) observes, "excessive optimism about what the state would be able to accomplish
was replaced by excessive pessimism." The deregulation of financial markets and the
resulting lobalization of finance were part of this process, as was the rise of neoliberalism
in domestic economic policy. Neoliberals proposed a radical rolling-back of state capacity
with comprehensive deregulation and substantial cuts in taxes and public expenditure.
However, even where regulatory structures were swept away, there has been reregulation
in response to the unsatisfactory performance of unconstrained markets. Recent discussion
of the need for a new global financial ‘architecture’ is part of this process. After two
decades of neoliberalism, state capacity has not been substantially reduced.
In some respects, market-oriented reforms have enhanced state capacity. While
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claims of a reinvention of government (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) are overstated, the
attempt to make governments more market-oriented has, in many cases, increased the
capacity of the public sector to provide services efficiently and with lower budgetary
costs. Dogmatic presumptions such as the view that government business enterprizes
should not earn a return on capital, or that public sector employees must work under
conditions radically different to those prevailing in the private sector have been discarded.
In some cases, they have been replaced by different, but equally dogmatic, presumptions,
such as the belief in the universal applicability of purchaser–provider splits or ‘user
pays’. Nevertheless, the net effect of reform has been to increase the range of organizational
and financial structures available to states seeking to provide human and other services.
Policy directions
For neoliberals, the main policy problem arising from globalization is that of winding
back government intervention in response to the limits on state capacity. By contrast,
social democrats must consider how to order social priorities in the light of undeniable
limits on state capacity, but also how to maintain and increase state capacity. In this
section, some responses to the latter problem are considered.
Constraints on international financial flows
The financial crises of the late 1990s led to a general reassessment of the desirability
of unregulated international financial flows. Central banks, which had previously advocated
minimal regulation, expressed support for a ‘new global financial architecture’.  Although
most advocates of a new financial architecture envisaged only modest improvements in
prudential regulation, there was increasing support for ad hoc interventions such as capital
controls and a reappraisal of proposals for more systematic intervention.
The most popular proposal of this kind calls for a small tax on all international
financial transactions. The proposal was first put forward by Tobin (1988, 1991) and is
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commonly referred to as the ‘Tobin tax’. Related ideas have been put forward by Stiglitz
(1989). The arguments for and against a Tobin tax have been discussed in Quiggin
(2000), from which much of the discussion below is drawn.
Most proposals for a Tobin tax have been based on the assumption that an international
agreement could be reached to levy a tax on financial transactions wherever they took
place, and that the resulting revenue could be divided among national governments or
paid to the United Nations. Although the prospect of an agreement like this may appear
remote, many of the issues that are raised by considering an idealized Tobin tax are
relevant in evaluating more limited and practical policy options for controlling financial
flows. There are a number of different motives for considering a Tobin tax. They may
broadly be classed as macroeconomic, microeconomic and revenue motives.
The main macroeconomic motive is the belief that the operations of financial
markets unduly constrain macroeconomic policy and represent a source of macroeconomic
instability. By reducing the volume of international financial flows, it is hoped that a
Tobin tax will reduce the influence of financial markets on macroeconomic policy. One
concern is that markets place excessive weight on inflation as a policy objective. With
the major exception of stocks, and instruments based on stock prices, the profitability of
the majority of financial instruments depends either on the actual rate of inflation, or on
the rate of inflation relative to other countries. To the extent that financial markets are
able to direct government policy, therefore, they are likely to impose a deflationary bias.
A second concern is that the short-term power of financial markets may result in financial
crises, even in countries where economic policies are sustainable in the long term.
The microeconomic reasons for considering a Tobin tax include, firstly, the concern
that financial markets appear to increase the risks faced by firms and individuals engaged
in economic activity by, for example, increasing the volatility of exchange rates. Secondly,
it is widely perceived that the resources consumed in financial markets represent a loss to
the economy, and the rewards earned by market participants are excessive compared to
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the economic benefits they generate. Thirdly, there is a concern that prudential regulation
may be undermined by the availability of risky, large-scale and hard-to-monitor financial
instruments. This concern has been heightened by a number of financial collapses involving
derivatives. A more general concern is that the control exercized by markets over
macroeconomic policy may be extended to microeconomic and social policy, ‘punishing’
governments that pursue, for example, redistributive taxation and welfare policies. In all
of these cases, it is hoped that, by reducing the volume of financial transactions, and
confining the financial sector to a supporting role in facilitating trade and long-term
investment, a Tobin tax would reduce the damage associated with excessive financial
speculation.
Finally, a Tobin tax is attractive when considered simply as a potential source of
revenue for governments and, possibly, international institutions such as the United Nations.
Various estimates suggest that the volume of financial transactions is between 10 and 100
times that of real transactions. As a first approximation, this implies that a Tobin tax
could raise between 0.4 and 4 per cent of GDP. The latter estimate is certainly too high,
since 4 per cent is implausible in the context of a financial sector with total resources
equal to about 12 per cent of GDP, much of which is in the retail sector (banking,
insurance and real estate services for households and small business). Moreover, the
volume of financial transactions would shrink if the tax were imposed. (This is, of
course, a desired outcome.) It is reasonable to anticipate a revenue yield of between 0.2
and 1 per cent of GDP from the imposition of Tobin tax. A Tobin tax could, therefore,
raise significant revenue. Note that this would not represent a solution to the problems
associated with the difficulty of taxing mobile capital. The revenue a Tobin tax might
yield is much less than the revenue currently raised by taxing capital income, and the
existence of a small Tobin tax would not deter owners of capital from moving their
capital to countries with low tax rates.
The most obvious objection to a transactions tax is that the tax could be avoided or
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evaded either by substituting exempt for taxable transactions, or by shifting transactions
to a financial centre that does not levy the tax. Unless a tax is imposed universally, it is
argued, a shift in transactions to financial centres where the tax is not applied would
nullify it. This claim appears premature, to say the least. After all, it is already possible in
principle to completely avoid income tax by making all income-generating contracts in
jurisdictions that levy no income tax (tax havens). Although in practice considerable tax
is already avoided in this fashion, countries nevertheless do succeed in levying income
taxes (at widely divergent rates) on their residents.
Moreover, prudential problems, such as those associated with the near-collapse of
the US hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, in 1997 can only be fixed by
imposing a rigid separation between financial institutions that are regulated and protected
by central banks, and those that are not. Given that the standard objection to a Tobin tax
is that it will simply drive speculators offshore, this would be an advantage in the context
of an internationally supported system of prudential regulation. Countries could choose
to operate outside the Tobin tax net and the system of prudential regulation in the
knowledge that they would not have access to the IMF if things went wrong. Financial
institutions could choose to base themselves in countries operating outside the Tobin tax
regime, but they would be unable to borrow from central banks or the institutions operating
within their prudential control. On the other hand, arguments concerning the possibility
of substituting exempt for taxable transactions appear well-founded. It would appear that
the only feasible approach is to tax all financial transactions, domestic and international,
at a common rate. Many countries, already tax a range of ‘retail’ financial transactions,
such as bank debits and credits, often at rates higher than those envisaged for a tax on
international transactions.
No matter how compelling the arguments in its favour, there seems little likelihood
that a Tobin tax will be adopted in the near future. There is a need, therefore, to focus on
other instruments that can be implemented unilaterally, like deposit requirements. Although
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details vary, deposit requirements are generally applied to capital inflows, with the intention
of deterring speculative inflows and outflows In 1974, the Australian government adopted
a deposit requirement, under which a proportion of capital inflows had to be lodged with
the Reserve Bank for several months. A similar scheme has been in operation in Chile
since speculative flows brought about the collapse of its financial system in 1979.
Deposit requirements impose a relatively high effective tax on a relatively narrow
range of transactions and bite most severely in periods when exchange rate alignments
are under pressure, resulting in large flows of short-term capital. They therefore appear to
be a more appropriate response to the instability associated with large-scale capital flows
than Tobin taxes.  On the other hand, Tobin taxes may be a more appropriate response to
the microeconomic distortions associated with an over-expanded financial sector.
Continental social democracy
A natural response to the limits on national macroeconomic independence associated
with globalized capital markets is the development of a co-oper tive international approach
to macroeonomic policy. In this context, it is noteworthy that, while welcoming the
erosion of domestic economic sovereignty, neoliberals typically favour a high degree of
Westphalian sovereignty. Conversely, they are generally hostile to international co-
operation, except in the n gative form of agreements not to interfere with the flow of
goods and services. In particular, US neoliberals generally reject the idea of linking trade
issues, such as China's proposed membership of the World Trade Organization, with
human rights, environmental or labou issues.
The ambiguities of the relationship between globalization and neoliberalism are
particularly evident in relation to the European Union. British neoliberals are generally
sceptical about, or openly hostile to, the idea of European unification. On the other hand,
the idea that, because most European trade is internal, a unified European economy
would be independent enough to permit the adoption of Keynesian and social-democratic
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policies without regard to the dictates of financial markets has been advocated most
prominently by Hirst and Thompson (1996).
Progress towards European economic unification remains limited. The European
Monetary Union is already in place, although important European countries including the
United Kingdom have so far not joined.Moves are now being made to harmonize the
rates of tax on income from capital to prevent the competitive bidding down of rates.
Some income redistribution across national boundaries has taken place, though primarily
as the result of sectoral initiatives.
By contrast, the European Parliament and associated institutions such as the European
Commission remain ineffectual, so that the European economic policy (other than monetary
policy) is still effectively determined by national gover ments acting either alone or in
consultation through bodies such as the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, given the
steady progress towards integration that has taken place so far, it is reasonable to predict
that federal European economic policy will continue to grow in importance relative to
national policy.
If nation–states are taken as the unit of analysis, the integration of Europe represents
a substantial loss of Westphalian and interdependence sovereignty. However, in the
contest between social democracy and neoliberal globalization, the nation–state per se is
only marginally relevant. The crucial issue is whether policy is to be determined by the
wishes of a democratic electorate, or to be tightly constrained by the ‘Golden Straightjacket’
of international financial markets.
The first steps towards European monetary union tended to support the latter view.
The struggle to meet the limits on budget deficits and public debts imposed by the
Maastricht criteria for participation in European Monetary Union gave a deflationary bias
to European macroeconomic policy for much of the 1990s. However, since monetary
union has commenced, the general stance of monetary policy has been modestly
expansionary. Moreover, there has been some growth in European state capacity, reflected
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in initiatives such as the European social charter.
The direction of future developments in Europe will turn, in large measure, on the
performance of the major continental European economies relative to that of the United
States and United Kingdom. If European unemployment remains high and the boom in
the United States continues, governments will face increasing pressure to introduce
neoliberal ‘reforms’. On the other hand, if the current boom in the United States is
followed by a serious slump, or even a sustained slowdown, the inherent dangers in an
economy characterized by a weak government and minimal welfare provision will again
become evident.
All of this is as it should be. If neoliberal policies produce better-than-expected
economic and social outcomes, social democrats must revise their views and consider
less interventionist policies. Conversely, given the poor to mediocre performance of
neoliberal policies in New Zealand and the United Kingdom, a failure to sustain the
present strong performance of the United States economy would greatly weaken the case
for neoliberalism. In either case, choice should be driven by judgements about what kinds
of policies would produce desirable outcomes, rather than by obedience to the supposed
demands of global capital markets.
Concluding comments
Claims of inevitability are commonplace in policy debates. It is frequently argued
that the success of some policy program or other is historically inevitable and therefore
should be supported. For much of the 20th century, historicist claims of this kind were
most commonly made by Marxist and Fabian socialists, but during the 1990s, the same
line of argument was taken over by supporters of neoliberal globalization.
The analysis presented in this paper gives little support to the view of globalization
as an exogenous force that has undermined domestic economic sovereignty. On the
contrary, financial globalization is best interpreted as the international counterpart of
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domestic neoliberalism. Both in domestic and international policy, the swing to
neoliberalism was a response to the actual and perceived failures of the post-1945 policy
framework in which domestic Keynesianism and the welfare state were complemented
internationally by the Bretton Woods system.
The advocates of neoliberal reform have had only limited success in implementing
their policy agenda, even in the English-speaking countries. The choice between continued
neoliberal reform and a remodelled social democracy remains open. The direction chosen
by democratic governments will ultimately depend on the relative success of competing
economic and social models, rather than on an exogenous process of globalization.
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